海洋资源开发中污染治理的政府激励机制分析——以海水养殖为例  

An Analysis on the Government's Incentive Mechanism to Resolve Pollution in Exploitation of Marine Resources

作　　者：于谨凯[1] 李文文[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学经济学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《浙江海洋学院学报（人文科学版）》2010年第2期8-14,共7页Journal of Zhejiang Ocean University(Humane Science)

基　　金：山东省自然基金项目"山东省海洋资源生态开发的政府激励系统研究"(编号:Y2008H02)

摘　　要：海水养殖业的发展带动了经济的发展,但同时也给环境和生态造成了压力。本文基于博弈论和信息经济学的委托代理理论对政府和企业在海洋污染治理方面的行为进行分析,认为在信息非对称情况下政府通过一定的激励机制对个体利益者进行激励,能更好解决由海水养殖带来的污染问题。激励机制中激励系数的确定与个体的努力程度相关,激励方式除了物质激励还可考虑其他激励方式。为使激励机制能良好运行,应引入监管机制并配备相应的法律法规加以协调。Mari-culture promotes the development of economics,but also lays pressure on environment and ecology.Based on game theory and principal-agent theory of information economics,the government and enterprise’s conducts in handling marine pollution are discussed.In case of asymmetric information,the government,going through certain incentive mechanism which carries out the in-terests of individual motivation,will give better resolution to the water pollution problems.The determination of excitation coefficients in incentive mechanism depends on the degree of individual efforts.Incentive approach could consider some different ways in addition to a material incentive.In order to promote a good operation and make incentive mechanism runs smoothly,regulatory mechanism should be introduced,together with corresponding regulations and policies.

关 键 词：海水养殖 污染治理 博弈分析 激励机制 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]