康德-图林佯谬及其消除——兼论“图林测试”的道德哲学意义  

Kant-Turing's Dilemma and Its Exclusion: the Ethical Significance of Turing's Test

作　　者：颜青山[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系,上海200241

出　　处：《伦理学研究》2010年第5期54-59,共6页Studies in Ethics

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目"价值道义论:在理由与行动之间"(09BZX057);华东师范大学冯契基金资助

摘　　要：将具有自由意志的"图林机"看作康德式"理性存在"的一种理想模型,可以提供道德哲学讨论的替代性方法论基础。但是,这里首先会遇到一个佯谬:通过图林测试的图林机要以"说谎"来证明自己是"理性存在",从而违背了(道德的)理性法则。这就是所谓的"康德-图林佯谬"。我们的论证将表明,图林机不会说谎,从而康德-图林佯谬并不存在。If a Turing's machine with free-will were regarded as a rational being posed by Kant, an alternative methodology of philosophy of moral would be grounded. But a logical dilemma we must confront as follows: a Turing's machine passing the Turing's test must prove it a rational being via telling lies, so that it conflicts the rational law of morals. That's so-called kant-Turing dilemma. But we argue that a Turing's machine isn't able to tell a lie. So there is not such a dilemma.

关 键 词：图林机 理性存在 康德-图林佯谬 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学] B82-02