基于解聘补偿的股权激励模型研究  

Study on Stock Option Incentive Models Based on Dismissal Compensation

作　　者：刘新民[1] 温新刚[2] 丁黎黎[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266510 [2]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《经济数学》2010年第3期9-15,共7页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971078);教育部人文社会科学研究一般规划资助项目(09YJA630089);山东省自然科学基金重点资助项目(Z2007H04);山东省软科学资助项目(2009RKB152)

摘　　要：传统的委托代理模型存在激励的短期性与道德风险的单边性两方面的问题.通过引入解聘补偿机制,建立并分析了信息完全对称和不完全对称两种情况下的股权激励模型,研究了委托人解聘倾向对股权激励合同设计的影响机制.研究结果表明:在初始合同中引入解聘补偿,不仅可以有效缓解委托人的道德风险,而且可以进一步提升代理人的工作努力程度.The traditional principal-agent model has two disadvantages with one being the short-term incentive, and the other the unilateralism of the moral hazard. This paper established a stock option incentive model based on the dismissal compensation, studied the optimal design of the incentive contract under symmetrical and asymmetrical information conditions, and analyzed the effect of the dismissal tendency on the design of the incentive contract. The findings suggest that the introduction of the dismissal compensation into the initial contract not only relieves the principal＇s moral hazard, but also further improves the agent＇s working efforts.

关 键 词：解聘补偿 解聘倾向 股权激励 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]