基于股权制衡视角的大股东占款与审计意见关系研究  

The Relationship between Large Shareholders Tunneling and Audit Opinions Based on Blockholders Counterbalance

作　　者：张力[1,2] 于海林[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学会计学系,南京210093 [2]安徽工业大学管理学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出　　处：《经济问题》2010年第10期108-112,共5页On Economic Problems

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社科重点研究基地项目(2010sk186)

摘　　要：利用2005～2008年我国A股市场数据,从上市公司股权制衡的视角考察了大股东占款与审计意见之间的关系。研究发现,股权制衡与外部审计对大股东占款现象具有一定的治理作用:大股东占款程度越严重,审计师出具非标准审计意见的可能性越大;股权制衡对大股东占款行为具有监督作用,进而促使审计师更倾向于对大股东占款行为出具非标准审计意见。Based on a dataset of audit opinions and other data in china＇s listed companies from 2005 to 2008,this paper analyzes the relationship among the large shareholder tunneling,blockholders counterbalance and audit opinions viewed from the the perspective of blockholders counterbalance.The research finds that blockholders counterbalance and audit opinions helps reduce the large shareholder tunneling ： the probability of the issuance of qualified opinions is positively related to tunneling;blockholders counterbalance could monitor the behavior of large shareholder tunneling,and impel auditor issue appropriate qualified opinions.

关 键 词：股权制衡 大股东占款 审计意见 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]