拉图尔对实践科学观的本体论辩护  

Latour's Ontological Justification for Science as Practice

作　　者：刘鹏[1] 李雪垠[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系,江苏南京210093 [2]西南大学高等教育研究所,重庆400715

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2010年第5期66-72,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(CX08B-003R)

摘　　要：拉图尔对实践科学观的本体论辩护分为两个阶段:⑴基于广义对称性原则和拟客体的概念,他提出了自然-社会混合本体论;⑵由于广义对称性和自然-社会混合本体论所具有的某些缺陷及其招致的误解,拉图尔在对"社会"概念进行改造的基础之上,形成了一种新的关系本体论。后者构成了拉图尔科学社会学的完整体系,与实践科学观之间具有更大的相容性。Latour's ontological justification for science as practice can be identified as two phases:(1)the hybrid ontology between science and nature on the basis of generalized principle and quasi-object; (2) however,facing the critiques to this generalized principle and hybrid ontology,he found another way by modifying the concept of 'society' in order to develop a new relationist ontology. The latter not only lays a more coherent foundation for Latour's sociology of science,but is more compatible with the concept of science as practice.

关 键 词：实践转向 广义对称性 拟客体 本体论 社会 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]