渠道成员间为什么需要“同舟共济”?——双边专用性投资的作用机理研究  

Why Need Channel Members Be in the Same Boat?——The Research of Bilateral Specific Investments Function Mechanism

作　　者：王国才[1] 许景[1,2] 王希凤[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,南京江苏210093 [2]南京工业大学经济管理学院,南京江苏210009

出　　处：《经济管理》2010年第10期86-95,共10页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"混合渠道冲突情境下内部市场导向;网络嵌入性对渠道绩效影响机制研究"(70902009)

摘　　要：本文综合交易成本理论、关系交换理论和组织间学习理论,分析了渠道成员双边专用性投资对渠道关系绩效的三种作用机制,并以中国企业为研究对象,通过实证研究检验了在中国市场环境下不同作用机制的影响。研究表明,双边专用性投资可以同时通过降低合作中的机会主义行为、提高双方的信任水平以及促进关系学习提高关系绩效;机会主义行为、信任与关系学习起到完全中介作用,其中信任机制作用最突出,并对学习机制具有强化作用。本文研究丰富和发展了资源基础理论,并对我国企业渠道管理实践具有重要的指导意义。According to transaction cost economics, relation exchange theory and inter-organizational learning theory, this paper studies three function mechanism of bilateral specific investments on relationship performance, and testifies the effects of different mechanisms in the Chinese market context by using China companies as samples of empirical research. Studies show that： Bilateral specific investments can improve relationship performance through reducing opportunistic behavior, increasing the level of mutual trust and improving relationship learning simultaneously; opportunistic behavior, mutual trust and relationship learning functions as the completed mediation effects, and the effects of trust are more prominent. Trust can enhance learning mechanism. The research makes contributions to the development of resource based theory, and provides important guidance for China companies channel management.

关 键 词：双边专用性投资 机会主义行为 信任 关系学习 渠道关系绩效 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]