大股东的认购行为选择与再投资陷阱  

A Review on Qualified Investors’ Rules of Financial Products in Developed Foreign Markets

作　　者：唐洋[1] 李伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学商学院,天津300134

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2010年第10期52-58,共7页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70872052)

摘　　要：本文在代理理论的框架下,首先以2005-2008年沪深两市采用股权再融资方式融资的上市公司为样本,实证检验了上市公司大股东在股权再融资中的认购行为选择对陷入再投资陷阱的可能性的影响。结果发现:与大股东全部参加认购相比,大股东全部放弃认购时陷入再投资陷阱的可能性最高,部分放弃认购次之。其次进一步以上述样本中陷入再投资陷阱的公司为研究对象,发现对于已陷入再投资陷阱的公司而言,大股东全部放弃认购的公司陷入再投资陷阱的程度显著高于大股东全部参加认购的公司。上述发现为理解大股东认购行为选择的经济后果具有重要意义,为管理层监督和规范上市公司的投融资行为提供了依据。This paper empirically tests the impact of large shareholder giving up SEO subscription right on entrapment under the agent theory frame based on data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2008. Results show that giving up the SEO subscription right of large shareholder will increase the probabilities of entrapment. The biggest probabilities of entrapment will be happened if all of the large shareholders to give up the subscription, and the second probabilities of entrapment will be happened if some of the large shareholders to give up the subscription. Furthermore, we find that the degree of entrapment is deeper if all of the large shareholders to give up the subscription than that of all of the large shareholders to take part in the subscription. These conclusions have great significance for comprehending the economic consequences of the large shareholder to give up the SEO subscription right. It provided a theoretical basis for China Securities Regulatory Commission to supervise and standardize the investment and financing behavior of listed companies.

关 键 词：股权再融资 认购行为选择 再投资陷阱 大股东行为 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]