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作 者:程贵孙
出 处:《管理科学学报》2010年第10期89-96,共8页Journal of Management Sciences in China
基 金:教育部人文社会科学青年基金资助项目(08JC790036);上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金资助项目
摘 要:文章将消费者区分为广告厌恶型和广告无差异型,研究了消费者广告偏好差异和广告商平台接入行为对媒体平台价格竞争与广告量决策的影响,并进行了社会福利分析.研究发现,无论广告商是单平台接入还是多平台接入,媒体平台的广告费将随着广告偏好厌恶型消费者占消费者总人数的比例的增加而增加;同时在广告商单平台接入下,媒体平台利润将随着广告偏好厌恶型消费者的增加而增大,均衡广告量与社会福利最大化的广告量是一致的;而在广告商多平台接入下,媒体平台利润将随着广告偏好厌恶型消费者的增加而减少,并且媒体平台竞争均衡广告量是否大于社会福利最大化的广告量水平,这取决于广告厌恶型消费者占消费者总人数比例.Separating the consumers into two groups: ad-haters and ad-neutral,the paper builds the price and advertising competition model to find the effects of consumers' attitude on advertising and of advertisers' access ways on the advertising strategy of commercial television,and analyzes the welfare effect.The results show an increase in the proportion of ad-haters will increase the advertising price.The results also show,under the advertisers' single-homing,an increase in the proportion of ad-haters will increase the medias' profits and the competitive advertising equilibriums are consistent with the social optimum;and under the advertisers' multi-homing,an increase in the proportion of advertise-haters will reduce the medias' profits and whether the competitive advertising equilibriums are consistent with the social optimum depends on the proportions of advertise-haters.
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