服务外包中的客户企业参与度逆向选择模型  

Adverse selection model for customer enterprise participation degree in service outsourcing

作　　者：但斌[1] 宋寒[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2010年第5期681-688,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871128)

摘　　要：客户企业通过参与外包服务项目生产降低服务商生产成本,可达到减少服务费用支付的目的.然而,在不对称信息下客户企业不清楚参与行为对服务商生产成本的影响程度.针对不对称信息下客户企业参与度决策问题,建立客户企业参与度逆向选择模型,通过模型求解得到了客户企业参与度与服务费用支付相结合的服务外包合约菜单,并对合约菜单相关性质进行了分析.研究表明,当客户企业参与对服务商成本影响较小时,客户企业能设计出分离合约菜单;反之,靠近最高成本类型的服务商区域将产生混同,且客户企业参与对服务商成本影响越大,混同区域越大.Participation of customer enterprise in outsourcing project can decrease production cost of service provider and accordingly reduce payment of service charge.However,under asymmetric information,the customer enterprise can not clearly know its effect on the production cost of service provider.Pointing at the decision-making of the participation degree of customer enterprise under asymmetric information,an adverse selection model is established.Based on the model,the service-outsourcing contract menu with combining participation degree and transfer-price is obtained.Additionally,the corresponding properties of the contract menu are analyzed.The analysis demonstrates that if effect of the participation degree of customer enterprise on production cost of service provider is slight,the separating contract can be designed.Otherwise,there is pooling equilibrium in region near the service provider with the highest production cost,and the pooling region increases with the increase of the effect.

关 键 词：服务外包 逆向选择 合约设计 客户企业参与 委托代理 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]