基于资本成本的我国企业股东利益保护研究  

Protection of Shareholders Interest based on Cost of Capital

作　　者：汪平[1] 袁光华[2] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院 [2]首都经济贸易大学

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2010年第11期20-29,共10页Research on Economics and Management

摘　　要：股东利益保护问题长期以来受到学界的高度关注。本文认为,"资本成本约束"是公司股东利益得以保护的最为有效的财务机制。股东依据对企业进行投资的风险程度确定自己的要求报酬率,并以此构成对企业投融资活动等理财行为的极为严格的资本成本约束;企业以资本成本水平为底线进行价值管理,从而确保企业价值的持续增加;通过股利、资本利得等具体的价值实现形式,保障股东财富最大化目标的顺利实现。实证分析发现,我国企业的股东利益保护情况不甚乐观,近一半数量的企业没有能够实现股东投资的实际报酬率高于股东要求的最低报酬率即资本成本水平。The issue of shareholder interests＇ protection paper argues that the cost of capital constraints is the most has been paid high academic attention for a long time. This efficient financial mechanism to protect the interests of the shareholders. Shareholders determine their required rate of return according to the risk of their investment, and thus con- stitute an extremely strict cost of capital constraint for the company＇ s investment and financing activities. The company implements value management on the bottom line of cost of capital, to ensure the continuous increase in corporate value, and to ensure to realize the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth smoothly by the form of dividends, capital gains and oth- er specific value forms. Empirical analysis shows that the protection of shareholder interests in Chinese companies is not very optimistic, nearly half of our companies have not been able to achieve shareholders＇ actual rate of retum higher than, the required minimum rate of return, which is the cost of capital .

关 键 词：资本成本 目标实现指数 股东利益保护 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]