寻租、政治联系与“真实”业绩——基于民营上市公司的经验证据  

Rent -Seeking,Political Connections and Actual Performance:Empirical Evidence Underlying Privately Listed Companies

作　　者：杜兴强[1] 陈韫慧[1] 杜颖洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《金融研究》2010年第10期135-157,共23页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:71072053);福建省社会科学重点项目(批准号:2010A012);教育部人文社科基地重大项目(批准号:2009JJD790040)资助

摘　　要：本文使用中国民营上市公司高管政治联系的数据,以超额管理费用作为寻租的替代变量,研究了寻租、政治联系与真实业绩之间的经验关系。结果表明,政治联系、政府官员类政治联系均与超额管理费用显著正相关、是寻租的结果。真实业绩与政治联系显著正相关,但真实业绩与不同政治联系类型之间的关系具有不对称性:真实业绩与政府官员类政治联系及其强度大小均显著负相关、却与代表委员类政治联系及其层级高低均显著正相关。Using political connections data of top management of the Chinese privately-owned listed companies, and taking the excess administrative expenses as a substitution variable for rent-seeking, the paper empirically studies the relations between rent-seeking, political connections and actual performance. The results show that there is significant positive correlation between political connections and ＂government officials＂ and the excess administrative expenses, which is the result of rent seeking. Also, there is significant positive correlation between the actual performance and the political connections, but there exists asymmetric relations between the actual performance and different types of political connections.

关 键 词：寻租 政治联系 真实业绩 政府官员类政治联系 代表委员类政治联系 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济] F224