基于Rubinstein讨价还价的激励契约研究  

Research on the Incentive Contract Based on Rubinstein Bargaining

作　　者：吴国东[1,2] 蒲勇健[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆400047

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第4期110-114,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(07BJY017)

摘　　要：传统的激励契约理论通过假设委托人提供一个"要么接受,要么走人"的契约给代理人,从而搁置了委托人与代理人就契约进行的讨价还价问题。这种假设下,委托人能获得最大收入,但代理人只能获得保留收入。本文假设代理人可以与委托人就激励契约进行Rubinstein讨价还价,从而得到一份均衡的契约。在均衡契约中,代理人的收益往往会高于传统契约。Traditional incentive contract theory lay the bargaining problems aside by assuming that the principal who can maximize her profit offer an ‘Accept or out＇ contract to agent who can only gain his reserve revenue.This paper supposes the agent can make Rubinstein bargaining with the principal on the contract.The agent earns more in equilibrium contract than in the traditional contract.

关 键 词：激励契约 委托-代理模型 Rubinstein讨价还价 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]