债务契约、破产约束与产品市场竞争行为  

Debt Contracts,Bankruptcy constraint and the Competition in Product Market

作　　者：曾宏[1] 吴世农[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2010年第4期127-132,142,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70502013)

摘　　要：根据债务契约所规定的控制权转移特征,运用契约理论构建不同破产约束的债务契约模型,阐述其对产品市场竞争行为的影响,并分析企业可能采取的竞争行为,特别是破产约束软化程度对掠夺性竞争行为的影响。研究发现:随着债务契约破产约束的逐步降低,企业在竞争中会逐步减小均衡产量,导致企业在产品市场上的竞争力度下降,在一定程度上弱化对手掠夺性竞争行为的效果,从而阻碍产品市场优胜劣汰机制的发挥。故我国政府应适当强化企业债务破产约束,而债权人也应力图通过债务重组方式来解决其债务危机。According to the transferring conditions of firm＇s controlling rights decided by debt contract,this paper has built the standard debt contract,and the non-standard debt contract as well as the non – standard debt contract under the government＇s subsidy.The different effects on the competitive actions in product market of debt financing by each debt contract are analyzed in detail.Then,there is a discussion about the competitive activities the firms will take when they have the restriction of the financing,and the influences on predatory actions of the government＇s subsidy.This paper shows that the probability of debtor firm to be liquidated in the three debt contract become more and more small,and these cause the firm to lower its equilibrium product quantity.Therefore,the government should avoid helping firms with financial crisis by subsidy,and debt holders should try to solve the firm＇s financial crisis by debt re-organization.

关 键 词：债务契约 破产约束 债务危机 市场竞争 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]