基于收益分享合同的垃圾源头分类激励机制  

Incentive Mechanism of Resident Behavior in Household Waste Separation Based on Revenue Sharing Contract

作　　者：曹俊[1,2] 熊中楷[2] 何志武 

机构地区：[1]重庆科技学院经济管理学院,重庆401331 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [3]重庆市垃圾焚烧发电研究院,重庆401331

出　　处：《工业工程》2010年第5期19-23,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571088);重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(2006BB0188);重庆市教委人文社科基金资助项目(09SKP02)

摘　　要：通过建立两阶段的Stackelberg动态博弈模型,研究了固定不可燃垃圾处置费和变动垃圾处置费2种情况下,垃圾发电厂如何制订收益分享合同相关条款,促使居民实行垃圾源头分类,并提高可燃垃圾燃烧热值。结果表明:存在唯一的最优分享比例使得发电厂的收益最大,消费者的选择存在最优的可燃垃圾回收数量和最低垃圾燃烧热值水平。Household waste separation by resident at the source can increases the combustion heat value of combustible waste in the garbage incineration power plant,and at the same time reduces cost as well.To incite the residents to separate their waste at source,the garbage incineration power plant should shares its profit with the residents.Under the conditions of fixed and variable disposal fee,a two-stage Stackelberg dynamic game model is presented to describe the profit sharing problem.By this model,it shows how the garbage incineration power plant should design the terms in the contract with the residents such that the residents are willing to separate their household waste at source and at the same time the profit of the power plant is maximized.

关 键 词：收益分享 垃圾分类 激励机制 

分 类 号：F253.4[经济管理—国民经济]