基于质量跟踪的装配系统激励机制设计  

Incentive Mechanism for Assembly System Based on Quality Tracing

作　　者：双海军[1] 孟卫东[1] 黄波[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《工业工程》2010年第5期24-28,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士学科点基金资助项目(200806110003)

摘　　要：在最终产品制造商为核心企业,并只采用质量跟踪对零部件供应商进行质量控制的装配系统中,建立了基于质量跟踪和双边道德风险的装配系统质量控制模型,设计出了装配系统质量跟踪中的激励机制。研究表明,制造商可以通过质量跟踪和设计合理的激励机制(包括采购价格及赔偿系数),促使自身和供应商均自愿按双方事前约定的质量水平进行最终产品和零部件生产,最大化装配系统和制造商本身的利润。A supply chain composed of an assembly company and part suppliers is considered.As the principal in this supply chain,the assembly company traces the quality of suppliers＇ part to control the product quality.In considering the moral hazard for both the principal and the suppliers,a quality control model for the assembly system is developed.With this model,incentive mechanism for quality tracing is analyzed.It reveals that the assembly company can design a right incentive mechanism such that both sides are willing to do their manufacturing according to the pre-specified quality requirements.The incentive mechanism requires setting appropriate part price and penalty policy.As a result,the profit for both sides can be maximized.

关 键 词：装配系统 质量跟踪 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224.1[经济管理—国民经济]