经理管理防御下的经理更换与独立董事、监事监督效率  

Manager's Turnover under the Managerial Entrenchment and Supervision Efficiency of Outside Directors and Supervisor

作　　者：张海龙[1,2] 李秉祥[2] 

机构地区：[1]天水师范学院经济与社会管理学院,甘肃天水741001 [2]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《天水师范学院学报》2010年第5期70-73,共4页Journal of Tianshui Normal University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"经济转型期我国经理管理防御与企业投资行为研究"(70872092);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金"基于经理管理防御的我国企业投资行为的实验研究"(200807000009);教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金"经理管理防御对企业融资决策的影响研究"(09YJA630130)阶段性成果

摘　　要：以独立董事监督和监事监督为经理更换约束条件,引入经理管理防御并分析非单一监督主体模式下独立董事与监事的监督效率,结果表明:当不存在惩罚机制时,拥有信息量的多少是决定监督效率的高低判断标准;当存在惩罚机制时,独立董事和监事趋向做出一致的评价结果,而且信息优势和更少惩罚威胁两种优势集中在一方时,将提高监督效率.经理管理防御行为不仅降低了独立董事和监事获取信息的数量,而且对其福利水平产生影响,使信息优势和更小惩罚威胁优势产生更大的分离,从而可能降低监督效率.This article analyzed supervision efficiency of outside directors and supervisor under the managerial entrenchment with manager＇s turnover by the supervision of outside directors and supervisor.The results showed that as follows： when there was no punishment mechanism,the number of information was the level of supervision efficiency;when there is punishment mechanism,outside directors and supervisors tend to make the same evaluation results,and supervision superiority and the threat of punishment were two advantages of less concentrated in the party,which would improve the monitoring efficiency.Managerial Entrenchment not only reduced the information of outside directors and supervisors obtaining but also level of their welfare,so that information superiority and advantages of smaller threat of punishment were derived than before,which might reduce the efficiency of supervision.

关 键 词：经理管理防御 独立董事 监事 监督效率 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]