企业公司治理中银行债权监控的机制及其效应研究文献综述  

A Study on the Mechanisms and Their Effects of Banks' Monitoring as Creditors in firms' Corporate Governancing:a Review

作　　者：王满四[1] 吕靓[1] 

机构地区：[1]广州大学,广州510006

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2010年第11期147-151,共5页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划课题(批准号:07GE08);广州市哲学社会科学"十一五"规划课题(批准号:YZ2-19);广州市属高校科技计划项目(课题编号:63026)的资助

摘　　要：中国证券市场发展的时间较短,企业资金主要来源于银行体系。次贷危机的发生使得银行金融风险控制问题受到空前关注。对企业公司治理中银行债权监控的机制及其效应研究的文献进行梳理,具有非常重要的理论与实际意义。我们围绕负债融资对公司治理的作用及负债的代理成本与银行作为大贷款人所拥有的监控优势这一思路对相关文献进行了梳理,并提出了进一步研究的方向。Time that the Chinese stock market developing is shorter,the business enterprise funds mainly come from bank system.The occurrence of loan crisis make the bank financial risk control problem be subjected to an unprecedented concern.Reviewing the literatures on the mechanisms and their effects of banks＇ monitoring as creditors in firms＇ corporate governance,hase count for much theories with actual meaning.We follow the way of thinking as the role of liabilities,the agency cost of liabilities,and the banks＇ supervision advantages own by big loan person,which carried on comb to the related literatures,and put forward the direction of the further research.

关 键 词：公司治理 银行债权监控 代理成本 文献综述 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]