控制权分配与价值评估——一个不对称信息下风险投资的融资决策模型  

Control Rights Allocation and Valuation of Venture Capital: A Model of Financing Decision under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：袁鲲[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东商学院金融学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2010年第6期35-42,共8页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划基金一般项目"资产价格波动与银行体系稳定:理论与实证研究"(项目编号:08JA790025);国家社会科学基金青年项目"资产价格波动与金融体系稳定研究"(项目编号:10CJL017)资助

摘　　要：本文引入控制权的分配,建立了一个不对称信息下创业者和风险投资家合资组成创业企业的融资决策模型。结论表明,控制权分配显著地影响了风险投资中创业者和风险投资家之间的博弈均衡,风险投资家寻求获得必要控制权的努力,使创业者以部分控制权的转移为代价获得了较为优越的融资条件;控制权的均衡分配取决于创业者与风险投资家之间信息不对称的程度,信息不对称的程度越大,分配给风险投资者的控制权越多。This paper introduces the control rights into an analysis frame that aims on solving the problem of valuation of a new firm in the industry of venture capital,and presents the model of a relationship between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist engaged in the formation of the new firm under the circumstance of asymmetric information.We show that the value of control rights to entrepreneur and the proportion allocated to investor obviously influences the equilibrium between the two participants.Venture capital contracts explicitly assign greater control rights to the venture capitalist in cases with greater potential asymmetric information.

关 键 词：风险投资 控制权分配 价值评估 信息对称 融资决策 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]