实施最优排污权配置  

Implementing the optimal allocation of pollution

作　　者：刘昌臣[1] 肖江文[1] 罗云峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学系统工程研究所,武汉430074

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2010年第12期2151-2156,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(60674083)

摘　　要：对不完全信息下的最优排污权配置问题进行研究,设计了相应的实施机制——修改的Duggan机制.研究表明:该机制不仅实施了排污权的最优配置,而且在均衡路径上厂商缴纳的排污税总额等于排污造成的社会成本,达到预算平衡.此外,讨论了社会成本函数不可微、排污权最优配置为非内点解以及厂商地位不平等的情况下,排污权的最优配置实施机制.The paper investigates the optimal allocation of pollution when information is not complete and designs an implementation mechanism -- Modified Duggan mechanism. The result shows that modified Duggan mechanism implements the optimal allocation of pollution and on the equilibrium path, the sum of the pollution tax paid by manufactures is equal to the social cost caused by the emission of pollution. Thus on the equilibrium path, budget balancing is satisfied. The paper also discusses the implementation mechanism when the social cost function is not differentiable, the optimal allocation of pollution is not an interior solution or the regulator treats the manufactures differently.

关 键 词：最优排污权配置 实施 机制设计 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理] O22[经济管理—国民经济]