需求不确定条件下零售商主导的两级供应链博弈分析  

Game Theory Analysis on Retailer-led Two Class Supply Chain under the Condition of Demand Uncertainty

作　　者：李洋[1] 郭伟祥[1] 王立海[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北林业大学,哈尔滨150040

出　　处：《森林工程》2010年第6期82-84,共3页Forest Engineering

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(DL10BB05)

摘　　要：研究市场需求不确定条件下零售商主导的两级供应链博弈均衡问题。应用Stackelberg博弈思想,验证供应链企业通过合作能够实现供应链整体收益最优及各自收益的最优。为了使供应链企业之间的合作保持稳定,供应链上的企业采用有回购契约的合作机制,从而实现链上企业的双赢。This paper mainly deals with the equilibrium of the retailer-led two class supply chain model under the condition of market demand uncertainty.Based on the Stackelberg game theory,it was verified that,through cooperation,the enterprises of supply chain could achieve optimal benefits both overall and respectively.In order to maintain the stable relation of cooperation,the mechanism of buy-back contract was adopted to realize the win-win state among all the enterprises of the supply chain..

关 键 词：不确定需求 博弈论 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]