考虑零售商多任务参与下的供应链激励合约研究  

A Study on Supply Chain Incentive Contract Under the Multitask Participation of Retailers

作　　者：陈伟[1] 但斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2010年第12期10-17,共8页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于机制设计理论的供应链企业间知识交易模型及市场机制研究"(70871128);中央高校基本科研业务费科研专项研究生科技创新基金项目"供应链企业间的知识市场及知识交易模型研究"(CDJXS11021114)

摘　　要：运用多任务委托代理模型研究零售商产品销售和市场知识共享两项工作任务的最优激励合约后得出,若两项工作任务的成本函数之间相互独立,那么激励相容条件下两项工作任务的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优激励因子是各项任务下制造商边际收益的增函数、是零售商绝对风险规避系数、各项任务边际成本变化率和业绩方差的减函数,同时提出了效率风险的概念;而如果两项工作任务的成本函数是相互依存的,那么在激励相容条件下,产品销售任务的最优激励合约是"门槛型激励合约",并定量地给出了零售商的"门槛激励条件",最后结合模型结论从理论上解释了供应链企业间普遍存在的一些现实问题。The optimal incentive contract concerning the two tasks of retailers＇ sales and market knowledge sharing is analyzed by using muhitask principal-agent model. It concludes that if each cost function of these two tasks is independent and incentives are compatible, then the optimal performance revenue of the two tasks is also independent; moreover, the optimal motivator is an increasing function of manufacturers＇ marginal revenue for each task, but a decreasing function of both retailers＇ absolute risk aversion coefficient, the marginal cost change rate of each task and performance variance. Then the concept of efficiency risk is introduced in this paper. If each cost function of these two tasks is dependent and incentives are compatible, the optimal incentive contract concerning sales is a ＂threshold-based incentive contract＂, which is presented quantitatively in this paper. At last, some practical problems, which are prevalent among enterprises in the supply chain, are explained from the theoretical view combined with the conclusions from this model.

关 键 词：供应链 市场知识共享 多任务委托代理 效率风险 门槛型激励合约 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]