信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商参与的价格补贴契约设计  

Design for markdown money contract with a loss-averse retailer under asymmetric information

作　　者：刘珩[1] 潘景铭[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《控制与决策》2011年第1期111-114,119,共5页Control and Decision

基　　金：教育部科学技术研究重点项目(108112);国家自然科学基金重点项目(70932005);四川省软科学项目(2009ZR0064)

摘　　要：运用前景理论和委托代理理论,探讨信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商和风险中性供应商参与的价格补贴契约设计问题.通过对零售商订货行为和供应商定价策略的研究,发现信息不对称时零售商的最优订货量小于系统的最优订货量,因而价格补贴契约不能使整个供应链达到协调.最后通过算例进行了验证.Based on the prospect theory and principal-agent theory, this paper studies how to design the markdown money contract under asymmetric information when the supply chain is composed of a loss-averse retailer and a risk-neutral supplier. Through analyzing the order behavior of the retailer and the pricing strategy of the supplier, it is found that the order quality under asymmetric information is lower than the optimized quality of the centralized system. So the markdown money contract can not coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information. Finally, a numerical analysis is given to prove the results.

关 键 词：前景理论 委托代理理论 价格补贴契约 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]