线性需求供应链中企业交叉持股的定价和绩效变化研究  

Research on Pricing and Performance of Cross-Shareholdings in the Supply Chain of Linear Demand

作　　者：张汉江[1] 宫旭[2] 廖家旭 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]山东大学经济研究院,山东济南250000 [3]人民银行中山中心支行,广东中山528400

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2010年第6期65-70,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

摘　　要：供应链中企业交叉持股的定价和绩效的变化影响供应链上企业的合作关系乃至供应链竞争力的发挥。文章首先借助Stackelberg博弈模型讨论供应链中交叉持股对企业的影响,定量地推演无交叉持股前、交叉持股时和纵向一体化情况下定价和收益的差异;然后通过对推演结果的分析得出结论:交叉持股可以使市场价格下降的同时使供应链中企业的总收益增加;最后通过比较交叉持股与纵向一体化的外部效应,提出支持交叉持股、限制过度纵向一体化的企业战略建议。Pricing and performance of cross-shareholdings in the supply chain of linear demand impact on co-operations in the supply chain as well as the competitive play.Firstly,by Stackelberg game model,corporate cross-shareholdings in the supply chain is discussed,as an attempt to quantificationally deduce the differences of pricing and profit respectively among non cross-shareholdings,cross-shareholdings and vertical integration.Besides,with deducing the model,it is concluded that cross-shareholdings makes the market price fall while increasing the total revenue of corporations in the supply chain.Finally,by comparing the external effects,corporate strategy recommendations of supporting cross-shareholdings and limiting excessive vertical integration are put forward.

关 键 词：供应链 交叉持股 定价和收益 外部效应 STACKELBERG博弈模型 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F830[经济管理—国民经济]