大股东在SEO中的认购行为与恶性增资  

On the Subscription Behavior and Malignant Capital Increase of Major Shareholders in SEO

作　　者：唐洋[1] 刘志远[2] 李伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津商业大学商学院,天津300134 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《当代财经》2011年第1期112-120,共9页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"不同市场状态下基金投资行为与市场稳定"(70872052);国家自然科学基金项目"制度环境;投资者情绪与企业投资行为"(71072099)

摘　　要：文章在代理理论的框架下,实证检验了上市公司大股东在增发或配股(SEO)中的认购行为选择对恶性增资的影响。研究结果发现:无论大股东是否参加SEO认购,上市公司都存在恶性增资倾向。但是,与大股东全部参加认购相比,大股东全部和部分放弃认购均加重了上市公司恶性增资倾向。其中,大股东全部放弃认购的恶性增资倾向最大,部分放弃认购次之。上述发现有助于理解大股东的认购行为选择,并为监督和规范上市公司的投融资行为提供了实证支持。In the framework of agency theory,this paper examines the influences of the subscription options of the major shareholders in listed companies during the issuance or allotment of shares(SEO) on the malignant capital increase.The results show that whether the major shareholders participate in SEO subscription or not,there does exist the trend of malignant capital increase in the listed companies.However,compared with the total participation of subscription by all the major shareholders,the full or partial waiver of subscription by the major shareholders would increase the trend of escalate in listed companies.Of which,if all the largest shareholder give up subscription,the trend of escalate is the largest,followed by partial waiver of subscription.The above-mentioned findings are helpful to understand the subscription option behavior of the major shareholders,and provide empirical support to supervise and regulate the investment and financing behavior of the listed companies.

关 键 词：增发与配股 认购行为 恶性增资 资本投资 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]