管理层异质性与管理层薪酬契约效率  

Management Heterogeneity and Compensation Contracts of the Management

作　　者：黄寿昌[1] 陈星光[2] 李朝晖[3] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学会计与财务研究院,江苏南京210093 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093 [3]湖北经济学院经济学系,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2011年第1期72-79,共8页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"基金管理公司治理结构;内部控制与经营绩效"(70772034);2009年度江苏省普通高校研究生科技创新计划项目"内部控制的经济性质与机制设计"(CX09B_022R)

摘　　要：以管理层异质性作为概念基础,对管理层薪酬契约的决定效率和激励效率实施了联合检验。研究表明,董事与高管之间的"合谋"使我国上市公司管理层薪酬契约更多地满足了董事与高管的个人偏好而不是股东价值的最大化,董事与高管以超额薪酬方式共同分享"企业租金"的行为导致管理层薪酬契约偏离了最优契约标准。此外,董事与高管"合谋"对管理层薪酬契约效率的消极影响在国有上市公司进一步恶化,并随着第一大股东持股比例的上升有所弱化。Based on the concept of management heterogeneity,this paper tests the efficiency with which managerial compensation contracts resolve the agency problem in listed companies.Empirical results suggest that managerial compensation contracts satisfy the private preferences of directors and executive much more than maximizing shareholder＇s value because of the coalition between directors and executives.It is the sharing of economic rent of the enterprise between directors and executive drives managerial compensation contracts to deviate from optimal contract standards.Furthermore,the negative effect of coalition between directors and executive on the efficiency of managerial compensation contracts become more serious in SOE,but less serious with increase of the holdings of the first shareholder.

关 键 词：管理层薪酬契约 管理层异质性 最优契约理论 管理者权力理论 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]