控股股东更换是否会提高公司绩效——基于中国上市公司的经验研究  

Dose Controlling Shareholder Replacement Improve Performance of Listed Companies——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：张媛春[1] 邹东海[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2011年第1期88-93,共6页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金(项目编号:20090461245);山东省博士后创新项目专项基金(项目编号:200903081);山东大学自主创新基金(项目编号:69962185)的资助

摘　　要：控制权协议转让通常导致上市公司控股股东的更换,然而控股股东的更换是否能提高上市公司的绩效呢?本文对这一问题进行了实证研究。本文认为,控股股东的更换效率受投资者保护环境的影响,由于我国投资者保护环境尚不完善,控制权协议转让中存在较多的无效率交易,因此我国上市公司控股股东的更换并不能有效的提高公司绩效,这在股权转让比例较低的交易中表现得更为明显。本文以2002～2005年期间以协议转让方式更换控股股东的上市公司为样本,对样本公司2002～2008年的财务数据进行了统计检验,实证结果证明了本文关于控股股东更换效率的推断。本文的政策含义是,提高我国上市公司控股股东更换效率的关键在于完善投资者保护环境。Negotiated trade of corporate control is the main method of replacement of controlling shareholder for listed companies.Dose controlling shareholder replacement improve performance of listed companies？ This paper is an empirical study on this issue.This paper suggests： as the investor protection in China is still not perfect,many potential control shareholders buy corporate control for the private benefits.This may incur inefficient replacement of the controlling shareholder,furthermore,the lower the fraction of shares is traded,the more possible inefficient trade happens.This paper investigates the performances of listed companies which replaced their controlling shareholder during 2002-2005.The empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses about the efficiency of replacement of the controlling shareholder in our country.The policy remark is： raising the efficiency of the controlling shareholder replacements primarily depends on improvement of the mechanism of investor protection.

关 键 词：控制权协议转让 股权转让比例 交易效率 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]