具有任意投资水平的供应链协同预测博弈研究  

Game Analysis of Collaborative Forecasting for Supply Chains with Arbitrary Investment Level

作　　者：魏炜[1] 申金升[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学交通运输学院,北京100044

出　　处：《物流技术》2011年第1期97-99,107,共4页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：运用纳什均衡和贝叶斯更新模型,得到了供应链联合预测均衡的存在条件。模型中,供应商和零售商均需决定在预测技术上的投资水平,双方的需求预测将会被汇总成一个统一的预测。结果表明,双方预测能力越接近中等水平,越容易实现联合预测。预测能力偏离中等水平越远,越容易出现搭便车行为,即至少有一方不进行预测。This paper adopts Nash equilibrium and Bayesian updating model and discusses the conditions that favor supply chain collaborative forecasting. In the model, supplier and retailer should decide their respective levels of investment in forecasting technology. Their forecasts will be combined to form a unified forecast. The results show, forecasting capability at the avarage level leads to greater possiblity of joint forecasting. As the forecasting capability of a party deviating from the avarage level, especially when along an upward trajectory, the other party is more prone to free-riding, that is, not contributing to the joint forecasting effort.

关 键 词：贝叶斯更新 博弈论 协同预测 CPFR 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]