克里普克跨界识别与跨界同一理论辨析  

A Discrimination of Kripke's Theory about Transworld Identification and Transworld Identity

作　　者：刘叶涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]燕山大学文法学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《晋阳学刊》2011年第1期75-78,共4页Academic Journal of Jinyang

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"可能世界视域下的意义与真理理论研究"(08JC720014)成果之一

摘　　要：跨界识别和跨界同一是由模态逻辑可能世界语义学引发的重要逻辑哲学问题。基于对可能世界语义学创始人之一克里普克有关可能世界的哲学理解,特别是其关于跨界识别和跨界同一的基本观点的系统梳理和把握,可以得出如下结论:从可能世界本体论的温和实在论观点看,跨界同一是一个伪问题,而跨界识别是一个真正的问题,完全可以归结为本质属性问题。Transworld identification and transworld identity are two important problems of the philosophy of logic, which are triggered by possible worlds semantics of modem modal logic. On the basis of a systemic comprehensions of Kripke＇s philosophical viewpoints on possible worlds, especially his opinions on transworld identification and transworld identity, the following conclusions can be drawn： from the point of moderate realism of his ontological standpoint on possible worlds, transworld identity is a pseudo-problem, but transworld identification is a genuine problem, which can be reduced to the question of essentialism.

关 键 词：可能世界 温和实在论 跨界识别 跨界同一 本质主义 

分 类 号：B84-06[哲学宗教—基础心理学]