企业控制权转让的最优时机与均衡价格  

Optimal Timimg and Equlibrium Price for Control Rights Transfer of Company

作　　者：陈珠明[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广州510275

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2011年第1期105-109,114,共6页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70971144);国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532003);广东省软科学计划项目(2009B070300042)

摘　　要：应用实物期权博弈论,定性给出了企业在信息不完美条件下控制权转让的均衡价格和最优时机的解析解,并对影响最优时机的主要因素进行分析.结果表明:在其他条件不变的前提下,目标企业的质量越好、并购沉没成本越小、控股比例越高、购买者期望协同效应越大及转让价格越低等,则均会导致控制权转让越快;而目标企业所处的产业增长率和波动率越高,则控制权转让越快,并具有双重效应.By applying real option game theory,an equilibrium price and optimal timing under the condition of non-perfect information for the controlling shares transfer were given,and the comparative static analysis was made for the main factors which affect the the optimal timing.The results show that,assuming other conditions remain unchanged,the better the quality of target companies,the smaller M and A sunk cost,the higher the percentage holding,the greater the expected synergies,the more low transfer price will result in the transfer of control sooner.The higher industry growth rate and the volatility,the faster the transfer of control,and there is a double effect.

关 键 词：控制权转移 实物期权 最优时机 均衡价格 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]