渠道投机行为的相互性以及交易专有资产的影响  

Reciprocity of Interfirm Opportunisms in Marketing Channels and Impact of Transaction Specific Assets

作　　者：庄贵军[1,2] 刘宇[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]西安交通大学管理教学实验中心,西安710049

出　　处：《管理科学》2010年第6期43-52,共10页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70972102)~~

摘　　要：以营销渠道中投机行为的相互性为研究对象,基于相互性理论和营销渠道行为理论提出4个假设,以制造企业的营销渠道负责人为调查对象,通过问卷调查共获得139份有效问卷,采用多元调节回归模型对数据进行分析,探讨营销渠道中企业之间投机行为的相互性以及企业交易专有资产在其中发挥的影响作用。结果显示,投机行为在渠道合作伙伴之间具有相互性;企业针对合作伙伴在交易专有资产上的投入不但会降低其渠道投机行为,而且会正向调节渠道合作伙伴之间投机行为的相互性;企业针对合作伙伴在交易专有资产上的投入与合作伙伴的渠道投机行为之间无显著的相关关系。Taking the focus on the reciprocity of the opportunisms in marketing channels,this study proposes four hypotheses based on the theory of reciprocity and the literature of marketing channel behaviors.By means of survey,139 useable responses was obtained from a sample of marketing channel managers.This paper explores the reciprocity of interfirm opportunisms in marketing channels and the impact of transaction specific assets on it by analyzing the data with moderated regression model.The results show that the opportunisms between firms in marketing channels are indeed reciprocal as expected.Moreover,the transaction specific assets that a firm invests in the relationship with a partner not only can reduce the firm＇s opportunisms,but also positively moderate the reciprocity of opportunisms between the firm and the partner.In addition,the transaction specific assets are not significantly associated with the partner＇s opportunisms.

关 键 词：营销渠道 投机行为 相互性 交易专有资产 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]