为什么上市公司选择股权激励计划?  

Why Corporates Choose Stock Option?——Evidence from China

作　　者：吕长江[1] 严明珠[1] 郑慧莲[1] 许静静[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,200433

出　　处：《会计研究》2011年第1期68-75,96,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872022;70632002);教育部人文社科规划基金(06JA630016);上海市哲学社会基金(2008BJB021)的资助

摘　　要：本文研究上市公司选择股权激励计划的原因。本文发现,中国上市公司选择股权激励方案有其特有的制度背景和公司动机。这些动机之间彼此具有相互作用,且公司治理的影响更为重要。与国外相类似,对人力资本的需求是上市公司选择股权激励的动机;不完善的治理结构、严重的代理问题也会使公司有动机选择股权激励,但是,部分上市公司选择股权激励的动机是出于福利的目的,股权激励没有作为代理成本的替代却成为代理成本的结果。同时,处于市场化程度越高的地区公司越有动机选择股权激励。本文的贡献在于基于中国的制度背景对公司为什么选择股权激励进行研究,并发现了公司选择股权激励的内在动机。We examine the reason why some listed firms choose stock option and find that these firms take regulation and their own incentive into account during their decision-making about stock option.Moreover,regulation and corporate incentive have interaction with each other and the incentive from corporate governance is of primary importance.In order to attract and retain talents the firms will have incentive to choose stock option which is consistent with prior literatures.However,deficiency in corporate governance and severe agency problem will induce managers to choose stock option for their own welfare.Meanwhile,firms in highly marketized areas and less regulated fields are also inclined to choose stock option.The contribution of this paper is that we are the first to consider Chinese background into stock option and we find the real reason by this way.

关 键 词：股权激励 公司治理 代理成本 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F276.6[经济管理—国民经济] F224