关联交易与政府管制——基于信号传递模型的博弈分析  

Related party transactions and government regulations:game analysis based on signaling game model

作　　者：李莉[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]山东经济学院会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《科技与管理》2011年第1期37-39,共3页Science-Technology and Management

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金项目(Z2008H07)

摘　　要：文章运用信号传递动态博弈模型分析了企业关联交易行为与政府管制的关系,结果表明监管机构通过严格管制,加大企业虚假披露或隐瞒披露关联交易的难度,增加造假成本,加大违规处罚力度,可以使得公平关联交易型企业发送公平关联交易型信号最有利,发生非公平关联交易的企业发送非公平关联交易的信号能使自身效用最大,从而有效分离两类企业。In this paper,signaling game model is used to analyze the relationship between related party transactions and government regulation. We reach the conclusion that by means of rigorous regulations, we can separate enterprises that conduct unfair related transactions from those conduct fair related transactions,that is to say,enterprises conducting unfair related transactions and enterprises conducting fair related transactions will gain profits from sending their respective true signals.

关 键 词：关联交易 政府规制 动态博弈 信号传递 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]