上市公司高管薪酬现实状况、变化趋势与决定因素:1999～2009  

The Real Situation,Growing Trend and Affective Factors of Executive Compensation of Listed Companies:1999-2009

作　　者：何杰[1] 王果[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学工商管理学院,四川成都610074

出　　处：《改革》2011年第2期95-103,共9页Reform

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金规划项目"企业社会责任的履行与公司法有关研究"(批准号:09YJA630137)

摘　　要：以1999～2009年中国上市公司的全样本面板数据,对中国上市公司高管薪酬的现实状况、变化趋势与决定因素分析表明,中国竞争性行业上市公司总经理的薪酬决定基本遵循了市场的决定逻辑,治理机制也发挥了一定的作用;而垄断性行业上市公司总经理的薪酬由于行业的行政性垄断性质,使其在决定机制上偏离了市场原则,尽管其利用政治激励等方式使其薪酬水平在绝对意义上相对较低,但这一措施却扭曲了公司治理机制的正常作用。在其他条件一定的情况下,企业的政府控制特别是中央政府控制,由于其委托-代理链条的延长,使企业高管薪酬比私有产权控制企业相对更高。This paper explores the real situation,growing trend of executive compensation and its affective factors based on the panel data of listed companies in 1999-2009 in China,which finds that executive compensation is oriented by its performance and ability in competitive industry,but not in administrative monopoly industry.In competitive industry,there is the evidence that executive compensation is raised by its power.Executive compensation is affected by ownership concentration,size of board of director,but not by independent directors.Executive compensation is much more determined due to being controlled by central or local government than by private property right.

关 键 词：上市公司 高管薪酬 竞争性行业 垄断性行业 

分 类 号：F231[经济管理—会计学]