公安机关警队之间信息共享的博弈分析——以基层公安局警队为例  

Analysis of Information Sharing between Grassroots Units of Public Security——Take for Example Grassroots Units of Police Bureau

作　　者：韩鹏[1] 王沛[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民公安大学,北京100038 [2]对外经济贸易大学,北京100029

出　　处：《公安理论与实践（上海公安高等专科学校学报）》2011年第1期38-41,47,共5页Journal of Shanghai Police College

摘　　要：作为基层公安局的重要组成部分——各个专业警队,其之间的协作互助无疑有利于公安机关功能的放大和绩效的提升,警队之间的信息共享也是如此。将理性的民警和警队视为理性人或组织,设计其博弈模型并分析利益损益的各种情形,通过推导出的结果可知,基层公安局警队之间是否能够信息共享,关键要看是否存在能够产生协作的理性条件(如科学的绩效评估制度等),换言之,如果能够建立信息共享对双方或多方均为有利的制度,则警队之间的协作条件便会理性地生成并发挥作用。All professional police forces are important components of grass-roots public security bureau.The mutual cooperation between them is undoubtedly beneficial to the functional amplification and performance improvement of public security agencies.The information-sharing is just the case.Take the policemen and the police forces as rational individuals or rational organizations.By designing their game models,analyzing various kinds of profit and loss situations and deducing the consequences,we know that whether the grassroots police units can share information or not mainly depend on the existence of rational collaboration conditions（for example,a scientific performance assessment system,etc.）.In other words,if we can establish an information sharing system which is a favorable institutional arrangement to two or more parties,the collaboration between police forces will be formed in a rational manner and have an effect.

关 键 词：专业警队 信息共享 警队合作 警察绩效 

分 类 号：D631[政治法律—政治学]