询价对象之间是竞争还是合谋——基于IPO网下配售特征的分析  

Competition or collusion between inquiry objects

作　　者：刘志远[1] 郑凯[1] 何亚南[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2011年第3期35-44,共10页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"制度环境;投资者情绪与企业投资行为";项目批准号:71072099和"不同市场状态下基金投资行为与市场稳定";项目批准号:70872052

摘　　要：本文基于对IPO网下配售特征的分析,检验了参与新股询价过程的询价对象之间的互动关系,并进一步考察了可能影响这一互动关系的因素。研究发现:询价对象在询价过程中没有为了获得更多网下发行的新股而相互竞价,相反它们选择相互合谋共同压低报价;询价对象家数对合谋程度具有显著影响,家数越多,合谋程度越低;询价对象的异质性对合谋程度具有显著影响,异质性越高,合谋程度越低。Based on analysis of the offline allocation characteristics of IPO,this paper examines the interactive relations among inquired objects,and further investigates the potentially influential factors.We find that the inquired objects don＇t compete for obtaining more new shares issued through offline allocation in the process of inquiry;instead,they push the quoted price down jointly by tacit collusion.This study also reveals the significant effect of the number and heterogeneity of inquired objects on the degree of tacit collusion,the more inquired objects,the lower degree of tacit collusion,and the higher level of heterogeneity,the lower degree of tacit collusion.

关 键 词：询价对象 网下配售 询价制度 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]