激励发电节能减排交易的Nash均衡两级优化模型  

Two-stage Nash equilibrium optimization models for motivating energy-saving and emission-reducing trading of generation

作　　者：于超[1] 谭忠富[1] 胡庆辉[1] 王抒祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学电力经济研究所,北京102206

出　　处：《电力系统保护与控制》2011年第7期63-66,73,共5页Power System Protection and Control

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071053);教育部博士点基金项目(20070079005)~~

摘　　要：电力交易中心需要设计一种机制,将发电企业的环境成本内部化,从而在企业追求经济效益的过程中实现社会环境效益最大化。建立了燃煤发电企业节能减排交易两级优化模型,第一级优化模型将社会环境效益和发电节能效益最大化作为目标函数,并考虑机组出力约束、负荷约束和排污量约束等条件;第二级优化模型以各个发电企业的竞争利益最大化作为目标函数,以第一级模型的KKT条件作为约束。该模型反应出的边际排污激励价格机制,既可以从总量上控制SO2的排放、节约能耗,又提高了燃煤发电企业进行排污治理的积极性。算例分析表明,模型和算法可以实现发电节能减排、激励竞争的效果。Power exchange needs to design a mechanism, which can achieve the internalization of environmental costs of power generation enterprises, thus maximizing the social environmental benefits. Two-stage optimization models of energy-saving and emission-reducing for coal-fired power plant are established. In the first stage model, maximums of the social environmental benefits and energy-saving effect are taken as the objective functions with consideration of the unit output constraints, load constraints and emissions constraints, etc. In the second stage model, maximums of power generation enterprises＇ profits are taken as the objective functions with the constraints of KKT conditions of the first stage model. The proposed marginal incentive pricing mechanism not only controlls SO2 emissions from the total amount, but also improves emissions treatment initiative of coal-fired power generation enterprises. A numerical example shows that the proposed model and algorithm can achieve the effect of saving energy, reducing emission and encouraging competition during the process of generation.

关 键 词：节能减排 NASH均衡 博弈 非线性优化 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济] F205F224