基于纳什均衡理论的水权交易问题分析  

Analysis of Nash Equilibrium Model for Water Rights Market

作　　者：戴天晟[1] 顾宝炎[1] 赵文会[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海电力学院经济与管理学院,上海200090

出　　处：《哈尔滨理工大学学报》2011年第1期132-134,共3页Journal of Harbin University of Science and Technology

基　　金：上海市教委科研创新项目(09YZ335);上海市哲学社科规划基金青年项目(2008EZH001)

摘　　要：利用完全信息静态博弈论的方法对水权交易下,企业关于产量、节水量、需要购买水权数量及水权初始价格等问题进行了分析,并利用一阶最优性条件分别导出了企业产量和节水量的纳什均衡以及水权均衡价格.最后,以某区域水权交易为例进行了实证分析,结果表明,本文设计的水权交易博弈模型具有可行性和可操作性.In this paper,the problems of how firms decide on output,water-saving amount,demanded water rights and the initial price of water rights in water market are analyzed using the techniques of perfect information static game theory.Furthermore,the Nash equilibriums of firms output and water-saving amount as well as the equilibrium price of water rights is derived respectively by using the first-order optimality conditions.Finally a numerical example is presented and the result shows that the Nash equilibrium model is available and operable.

关 键 词：水权 纳什均衡 一阶最优性条件 节水量 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济] TV213[水利工程—水文学及水资源]