治理主体干预对公司多元化战略的影响路径——基于管理者过度自信的间接效应检验  

The Path of Influence of Corporate Governance Subject's Intervene on Corporate Diversification:The Test of Indirect Effect Based on Managerial Overconfidence

作　　者：周杰[1] 薛有志[2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学泰达学院 [2]南开大学商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2011年第1期65-74,106,共11页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70772050)资助

摘　　要：本文突破委托代理理论,以控制幻觉的基本假说为基础,从管理者过度自信的视角分析并检验了大股东、债权人与政府的干预对公司多元化战略的影响路径。研究结果表明,管理者过度自信促进了上市公司实施多元化战略的倾向;大股东与债权人的干预对多元化战略具有显著的抑制效应,这种效应一方面来自大股东与债权人的干预对管理者机会主义行为的削弱,另一方面来自控制幻觉的缓解对管理者过度自信的抑制。政府的干预对多元化战略并未产生显著的直接影响,但却显著地抑制了管理者的过度自信,从而间接地降低了上市公司的多元化水平。Since the phenomenon of the frequent failure of diversi-fication strategies and the benefit conflicts between the shareholder and manager in the process of the decision making about diversifi-cation strategy were revealed,the study on the effect of corporate governance on the diversification based on the agency theory has been an important research field.At present,however,most re-search logic and conclusions ignore the problem of cognitive biases that is the other causation leading to the failure of diversification strategies.Therefore,the existing research conclusions can’t inte-grally outline the path of the influence of corporate governance on corporate diversification.This paper analyses and tests the path of influence of large shareholders,debtors,and governmental inter-vene on corporate diversification from the perspective of manage-rial overconfidence based on the illusion of control theory which breaks through principal-agent theory.Our findings show that：（1） managerial overconfidence facilitates the fact that listed compa-nies tend to implement diversified strategies;（2） supervision and interference of larger shareholders and creditors have a significant restriction effect on diversified strategy,which originates from the weakness of managerial opportunistic behaviors by supervision and interference of larger shareholders and debtors and from restriction of managerial overconfidence by alleviation of illusion of control;and（3） governmental interference has no significant direct effect on diversified strategy,but it significantly restricts managerial over-confidence and hence indirectly reduces the level of diversification of listed companies.The test results above-mentioned implicate that,on the one hand,manger’s cognitive biases can lead the unsci-entific cooperation’s decision,therefore the resolve of agency prob-lem can’t completely assure the decision of diversification strategy success.Accordingly,optimizing the corporate governance based on the manager＇s cognition is very i

关 键 词：治理主体 多元化战略 管理者过度自信 控制幻觉 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]