市场监管、盈余分布变化与盈余管理——退市监管与再融资监管的比较分析  

Market Regulation,Earnings Distribution Change and Earnings Management:A Comparative Analysis of ST and SEO Regulation

作　　者：肖成民[1] 吕长江[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院会计与财务学院 [2]复旦大学管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2011年第1期138-147,共10页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70902063;70632002);教育部人文社科青年项目(09YJC630157)资助

摘　　要：通过考察第四季度引起的盈余相关指标分布变化,本文比较分析了上市公司针对退市监管和再融资监管采取的盈余管理行为。实证结果表明,相对于基于"相对指标"的再融资监管,上市公司规避基于"绝对指标"退市监管更容易提前操作;相对于"收益性"的再融资监管,上市公司规避"损失性"退市监管的动机更强。本文发现,不论针对哪一种市场监管,前三个季度的盈余相关指标比较接近监管阈值的公司实施了盈余管理行为。As a transitional economy,China puts strong regulation in her stock market and companies mainly react to these regula-tions with earnings management.In this paper,we test the different effect on earnings management of two dominate regulations： ST regulation and SEO regulation.We think these two regulations are different at least in the following two dimensions： ST regulation fo-cuses on punishing bad performance,while SEO regulation focuses on rewarding good performance;ST regulation is mainly based on absolute earning numbers,while SEO regulation is mainly based on relative earning ratios.Then we hypothesize that companies would react to ST regulation more early than SEO regulation.The above difference of these two regulations may cause difference in com-panies’ reacting earnings management.Based on prior literature,we measure earnings management in a more comprehensive way： we rely on kinks in earnings distribution,not accrual earnings.Companies’ earnings management may be adjusted by regulation and research,so it is appropriate to measure earnings management more comprehensive.Particularly,we examine the change of earn-ings distribution,not the distribution itself.By studying the change of earnings distribution in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year,we find evidence that is consistent with the above hypothesis： the kink of first three quarters’ earnings distribution is more apparent at ST regulation threshold than that at the SEO regulation threshold.We also find that companies’ earnings management in the fourth quarter is more apparent when their previous three quarter earnings level is much nearer to regulation threshold,and this finding is same to ST and SEO regulation.Prospect theory and regulation attributes difference can explain our evidence.An additional finding in this paper is that corporate governance’s role in restricting the earnings management to meet or beat regulation threshold is quite limited.Future research may examine whether the means of earnings man-agement is also dif

关 键 词：退市监管 再融资监管 盈余分布 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]