媒体监督、声誉机制与独立董事辞职行为  

Media Coverage,Reputation Mechanism and Resignation of Independent Directors

作　　者：李焰[1] 秦义虎[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,100872

出　　处：《财贸经济》2011年第3期36-41,60,共7页Finance & Trade Economics

摘　　要：以2006—2009年媒体负面报道过的公司为样本,本文研究了媒体监督对独立董事辞职行为的影响,并探讨了独立董事声誉机制在其中发挥的作用。本文发现,媒体负面报道量和独立董事的辞职概率显著正相关,而且影响力越大的媒体对独立董事辞职概率的影响越大。这说明媒体报道发挥了积极作用,特别是有影响力的媒体发挥了关键作用。在此基础上,本文还进一步证明,媒体报道之后,越重视自己声誉的独立董事辞职的概率越大,说明就独立董事这一群体而言,声誉机制可以发挥很好的治理作用。Based on the panel data of Chinese listed firms which were negatively reported by media from 2006 to 2009,the paper studies the relation between media coverage and resignation of independent directors and further discusses the role of reputation mechanism between media coverage and resignation of independent directors.This study finds that the number of negative media has significant positive relations to the probability of independent director's resignation.The more influential of the media,the higher probability of resignation of independent director,which means media coverage play a positive role,while influential media play a key role.On this basis,this paper further shows that,after the media coverage,the more independent director cares his reputation,the higher probability of independent director resignation is,which means that reputation play a positive role in company governance of independent directors.

关 键 词：媒体监督 声誉机制 独立董事辞职 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]