基于多任务委托-代理模型的IT外包激励机制分析  

Incentive Mechanism Model Based on Multi-task Principal-agent for IT Outsourcing

作　　者：周波[1] 张嵩[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学管理科学与工程系,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第1期84-88,共5页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70601014);山东省自然科学基金(Y2006H01)

摘　　要：基于委托—代理理论,运用霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆多任务委托—代理模型的分析框架,选取信息技术外包项目绩效中的技术效应和经济效益两项任务,建立多任务委托—代理模型,在两项任务相互独立和相互依存两种情况下,对信息技术外包激励问题进行分析。研究表明:两项任务相互独立情况下,企业对风险规避度低的接包方提高对其各项任务的激励强度;比较两项任务,当两者可观测变量方差相同时,对边际成本变化率低的任务提高其激励强度,当两者边际成本变化率相同时,对可观测变量方差小的任务提高其激励强度。两项任务相互依存情况下,发包方经济效益的激励强度在两项任务互补时应增强,在替代时应减弱。Based on the principal-agent theory, using the multi-task principal-agent model of Holmstrom ＆ Milgrom as an analysis framework, two tasks of the technical effects and the economic benefits of the IT outsourcing project performance were selected to build a multi-task principal-agent model. The issues of IT outsourcing incentive were discussed under two conditions of independent tasks and inter-dependent tasks. Research results show that under the condition of independent tasks, the corporation should enhance the incentive intensity of every task when absolute risk aversion of the vendor is lows Comparison of two tasks, the corporation should enhance the incentive intensity in the task of low change rate of marginal cost when their variance of the observable variables are same, and the corporation should also enhance the in- centive intensity in the task of low variance of the observable variables when their change rate of marginal cost are same. And under the condition of inter-independent tasks, the incentive intensity of the economic benefits should be enhanced when the two tasks are complementary, and reduced when substituted.

关 键 词：信息技术外包 激励机制 多任务委托-代理 道德风险 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]