股票型开放式基金管理报酬激励约束机制  

Management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism on the equity open-end funds

作　　者：尹洁[1] 陈收[1] 邹自然[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,长沙410082

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2011年第4期740-748,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71031004);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金(20090161120034)

摘　　要：为分析基金管理报酬激励约束机制,采用静态面板数据构建模型,对我国股票型开放式基金的管理报酬与业绩进行了实证,结果表明管理报酬没有起到相应的激励约束作用.对此,运用委托代理理论对现有管理报酬模式进行改进,采用反映管理者努力水平的超额收益率衡量基金业绩,提出固定费用结合超额业绩报酬激励的混合管理报酬模式.并在相同的报酬成本下,通过比较两种不同管理报酬模式下基金管理者最优努力水平,验证混合管理报酬模式在促进基金管理者努力工作上的优越性.To analyze the fund management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism,it empirically examed the relationship between the equity open-end fund management compensation and performance based on the static panel data model.The results show that fund management compensation incentive and restraint mechanism in China is not working effectively.So it made some improvements to existing contract using the principal-agent theory.It introduced excess return which reflects managers＇ effort level to measure fund performance,and designed a mixed management compensation contract which combines the fixed fees with floating compensation.In the last,it verifies the superiority of the mixed one in promoting fund managers work harder by comparing fund managers optimal effort level of the two contracts in the same pay cost.

关 键 词：激励约束机制 基金管理者 股票型开放式基金 

分 类 号：F713.6[经济管理—产业经济]