公交企业双目标激励模型  

Construction of dual goal incentive model of public transport enterprise

作　　者：赵淑芝[1] 高祥涛[1] 朱永刚[1] 倪同和[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学交通学院,长春130022

出　　处：《吉林大学学报（工学版）》2011年第3期650-653,共4页Journal of Jilin University:Engineering and Technology Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(51078168)

摘　　要：以降低公交企业运营成本和提高其服务水平为目标,以标准成本和最低服务水平为标杆,基于委托-代理理论,改进了政府补贴激励合同,构建了改进的委托-代理激励模型。通过实例验证了该模型的实用性。研究结果为政府对公交企业进行激励和完善财政补贴机制提供了理论依据。Taking the reduction of operation cost of the public transport enterprise and the improvement of its service level as targets, and its standard cost and minimum service level as benchmarks, an improved principal-agent incentive model was built based on the traditional principal-agent theory and the improved incentive contract of the government subsidy. The model was validated by a case study. The results provide a theoretical basis for the government to encourage the public transport enterprise and improve the financial subsidy mechanism.

关 键 词：交通运输经济学 补贴机制 激励模型 标准成本 

分 类 号：U491[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]