“金字塔”结构、两权分离与公司价值  

Pyramids Ownership Structure,Separation of Control and Cash Flow Ownership and Value of Company

作　　者：崔学刚[1] 张宏亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048

出　　处：《上海立信会计学院学报》2011年第2期3-13,共11页Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08CJY008);北京市自然科学基金项目(9112005);北京市社会科学规划重点项目(08AbjG215);北京市教育委员会高层次人才资助计划(PHR20100512)

摘　　要：企业的集团化伴随着"金字塔"式的多层控股结构的产生,"金子塔"股权结构带来了控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离,进而对公司价值产生影响。文章运用我国上市公司数据,检验了"金字塔"股权结构、两权分离对公司价值的影响状况与影响机制。研究结论对于加强上市公司监管、完善公司治理、保护中小投资者利益具有重要启示。As a type of general ownership structures, pyramids cause the separation of corporate ownership and cash holding of ultimate control shareholders, and influence company value. This paper examines the above theoretical hypothesis by using the data of listed company in 2007 and 2008 of China. The results indicate that the motivations of ＂tunneling＂ or ＂propping＂ are affected by the separation degree of control and cash flow ownership of pyramids structures. The result is significant for the supervision of listed company, the improvement of corporate governance and the protection of medium and small sized investors.

关 键 词：“金字塔” 股权结构 两权分离 利益攫取 利益支持 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]