上市公司终极所有权结构与股权激励绩效探究--基于中国上市公司平衡面板数据的经验证据  

The Empirical Research of the Relationship between Ultimate Ownership——Structure and the Effect of Stock Incentive by Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：刘存绪[1] 何凡[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川教育学院 [2]四川教育学院经济贸易管理系

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2011年第5期32-38,共7页Research on Economics and Management

摘　　要：利用2006年《上市公司股权激励管理办法》实施以来首次宣布股权激励计划上市公司2006～2009年的面板数据,本文研究我国实施股权激励的上市公司的终极所有权结构及其对股权激励绩效的影响。研究发现在我国实施股权激励制度的上市公司中普遍存在终极所有者控制的现象,终极所有者的现金流权与股权激励绩效呈显著的正相关关系,而其现金流权与控制权的分离度与股权激励绩效显著负相关,当终极所有者为国有身份时,公司取得的股权激励绩效更好,验证了国有终极所有者的"支持效应"。The paper analyzes the ultimate ownership structure of Chinese listed companies which conducted stock incentive. The research results display as follows. There is highly concentrated ultimate ownership structure in Chinese listed companies which conducted stock incentive. The ultimate controlling shareholders＇cash flow rights are positively related to the level of effect of stock incentive. However, the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights is negatively related to the level of effect of stock incentive. The Chinese listed companies which conducted stock incentive could gain more effect of stock incentive if the ultimate shareholders are state shareholders.

关 键 词：终极所有权 股权激励 公司治理 代理成本 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]