企业专用性投资资本与信号机制——兼论当前我国市场信用状况恶劣的原因  

Relationship-specific Investment Capital for Enterprise with its Signal Machanism——To Discuss Current Bad Credit in Our Country Market

作　　者：马本江[1] 解宇[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,长沙410083 [2]中南财经政法大学新华金融保险学院,武汉430073

出　　处：《经济问题》2011年第5期92-96,共5页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71072078);国家教育部博士点新教师基金项目(200805331059);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(09YJC790260);湖南省哲学社会科学基金项目(08YBA021)

摘　　要：建立基于企业专用性投资资本的产品质量信号传递模型,表明在信息不对称条件下,最终产品交易中企业的专用性投资资本起信用担保的作用,能够在一定程度上避免由于信息不对称所引致的逆向选择,从而节约交易成本。均衡时只有那些专用性投资资本M≥M(θ0)的企业,其产品才被市场接受,而专用性投资资本M<M(θ0)的企业,其产品则会被市场拒绝。较高的贷出资本的利率会提高人们对企业产品质量的预期。进一步,运用模型所得结论讨论了当前我国交易市场信用状况恶劣的原因,并提出了如何改善的政策建议。It establishes one model,which based on the enterprise relationship-specific investment capital signaling the product quality.To some extend,the relationship-specific investment capital has credit to assure the enterprise to avoid the adverse choice caused by communication asymmetry and economize the exchange cost.Model indicates that it will only be accepted by the market when those product with relationship-specific investment capital for,otherwize,it will be refused.It also indicates that the higher loan capital rate will improve the product quality in the enterprise as people anticipate.Finally it researches some problems about current bad credit in our country in exchange market and gives some corresponding suggestion to improve it.

关 键 词：专用性投资资本 信息不对称 信号传递 交易成本 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]