张载与王夫之的道德心理哲学  

A Comparative Study of Zhang Zai's and Wang Fuzhi's Moral Psychology

作　　者：刘纪璐 

机构地区：[1]美国加州州立大学富乐敦分校哲学系

出　　处：《社会科学》2011年第5期126-133,共8页Journal of Social Sciences

摘　　要：就当代学者来说,如何从经验考察来验证人是否有先天或普遍的道德情感会是很有启发的道德心理学议题。从道德心理哲学的角度重新解析张载以及王夫之的道德理论。探讨他们对道德的可能性,善的根源的解释,以及他们对恶如何产生,如何对付的主张,我们会发现,张载比较强调理性的重要性,而王夫之则从道德情感出发。两种理论的比较可以作为我们进一步思考的出发点。For contemporary scholars,it is an intriguing topic in moral psychology to appeal to empirical investigations as a way to verify whether we humans have inborn and universal moral sentiments.This paper takes the angle of moral psychology to render anew a comparative analysis of Zhang Zai＇s and Wang Fuzhi＇s moral theories.The focus of this comparative analysis is on how they address the possibility of morality,the origin of good and the roots of evil.The paper will argue that Zhang Zai＇s theory places more emphasis on the importance of reason in that it promotes a moral transformation through studying the texts of the sages to achieve a spiritual emulation of the sages,while Wang Fuzhi＇s theory stresses the moral function of our inborn moral sentiments as well as our ability of reflection.The former advocates the reduction of human＇s material desires,while the latter acknowledges the value of human desires to the point of identifying the heavenly principle with the universal gratification of individual desires.The slight differences in the two moral theories,which are otherwise very similar to each other,can serve as a starting point for our further thinking about the issue of what makes us moral.

关 键 词：张载 王夫之 道德心理学 道德理性论 道德情感论 

分 类 号：B82-054[哲学宗教—伦理学]