从垂直激励到平行激励:地方政府合作的利益激励机制创新  被引量:45

From Vertical Incentive to Horizontal Incentive:as an Innovation of Benefit Encouragement Mechanism in Local Government Cooperation

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作  者:杨爱平[1] 

机构地区:[1]华南师范大学公共管理学院

出  处:《学术研究》2011年第5期47-53,159,共7页Academic Research

基  金:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"区域一体化中的政府间合作机制创新研究--以珠三角区域一体化为例"(09YJC810013);国家社会科学基金一般项目"区域契约行政的激励与约束机制研究"(10BZZ026);广东省普通高校人文社会科学研究基地重大课题"泛珠江三角洲合作与广州城市转型互动关系研究"(06JDXM79005)的阶段性成果

摘  要:合理的利益激励机制是实现地方政府长效合作的制度基础。我国在发展型地方主义下形成的地方竞合机制,是以行政分权、财政分权和官员晋升博弈为三大杠杆的一种垂直激励机制,由于其存在内部激励与外部激励不兼容、政治动员而非平等博弈式激励的制度缺失等因素,因而利于政府间竞争但不利于政府间合作。在地方包容性发展的政策视阈下,高层政府应该通过指导和协调,构建涵盖地方政府间利益分配、利益协调、利益补偿、利益让渡的平行激励机制,从而使地方政府实现一种地位平等、意思自治、利益兼容的制度化合作。For practical purposes, local governments’ long-term cooperation is based on the incentive mechanism of reasonable interests. It is a competing cooperation mechanism composed of three pries, administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and official promotion game played under an environment of developmental localism, which benefits governments’ competition, but is not helpful to inter-governmental cooperation due to it is not only incompatible between internal motivation and external incentives, but also an incentive based on political mobilization rather than an incentive game with equal status. On the policy circumstance of inclusive development, through indirect guidance and coordination, a high-level government should construct a horizontal incentive mechanism, which includes the benefit distribution, benefit coordination, benefit compensation, and benefit assignment carried on by local governments. The horizontal incentive mechanism is an institutional cooperation because it may enable local governments to achieve an equal status, autonomy will, and interest compatiblity in the course of regional cooperation.

关 键 词:地方政府合作 利益激励机制 垂直激励 平行激励 

分 类 号:D035.5[政治法律—政治学]

 

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