控制权转移前业绩、收购方性质与控制权转移绩效  

Prior-performance, the Character of the Acquirer, and the Results of Controlling Rights Transfer

作　　者：涂国前[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2010年第4期415-430,共16页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目“产权保护导向的会计控制研究”(70532003)、国家自然科学基金项目“审计质量决定机制与审计师选择”(70772080)的部分成果

摘　　要：本文研究控制权转移前业绩、收购方性质对控制权转移绩效的影响。以1994—2007年中国A股市场发生控制权转移的公司为样本，本文发现：从长期绩效来看，亏损公司控制权转移后，业绩明显上升；盈利公司被转让给无经验的民营收购方后，业绩明显下降，转让给国有收购方和有经验的民营收购方后，业绩没有明显变化。从短期市场反应来看，转让给国有收购方和有经验的民营收购方的市场反应明显优于转让给无经验的民营收购方。Controlling rights transfer has long been very important in the capital markets around the world. The theory of market for corporate control is popular in the developed capital markets. However, China＇s capital market has its own characteristics, and it is questionable to use the theory of controlling rights transfer to study the controlling rights transfer in China. This paper examines the influence of prior-performance and the character of the acquirer on the results of controlling rights transfer. Firms with negative profits prior to the controlling rights transfers may try to have positive profits after controlling rights transfers. On the other hand, firms with positive profits prior to the eontrolling rights transfers may be tunneled and suffer loss after controlling rights transfers. This paper try to find who can improve the performance after controlling rights transfers, and who will do harm to the performance after controlling rights transfers, and whether this is different in firms with different priorperformance. Using the companies that occurred controlling rights transfer in the period of 1994--2007 in China＇s A-market as the sample, this paper finds： （1） the performance of firms with negative profits prior to the controlling rights transfers improve significantly after controlling rights transfers, no mater who acquired the controlling rights; （2） the performance of firms with positive profits prior to the eontrolling rights transfers don＇t change obviously after controlling rights transfers if the acquirers are state-controlled or experienced entrepreneurs, however, if the acquirers are non-experienced entrepreneurs, the performance go down signif- icantly after controlling rights transfers, （3） the stock market pays a higher premium for those acquired by state-controlled acquirers or experienced entrepreneurs than those acquired by non-experienced entrepreneurs. This paper sheds lights on the study on the market for corporate control in China, especially on what determining

关 键 词：收购方性质 控制权转移 绩效 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]