不对称信息下供应商安全状态监控策略分析  

Analysis of supplier's security state inspection strategy under asymmetric information

作　　者：张煜[1] 汪寿阳[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京100080

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2011年第5期11-18,42,共9页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70731003)

摘　　要：供应商风险是供应链风险的主要来源之一.对于零售商来说,如何采取策略应对供应商可能出现的风险至关重要,然而使得策略有效的关键在于零售商及时获知供应商的安全状态信息.一方面这些安全状态信息是供应商自身的私有信息,供应商比零售商更加容易了解风险发生的可能性;另一方面,即便是供应商自身的信息,因为涉及到安全状况,也需要不断地进行监控、评估、认证等方面的投资才能准确获得.针对以上情况,研究了在零售商对供应商安全状态信息未知的情况下,零售商如何向供应商提供的两种不同性质的契约:奖励或惩罚,根据利润最大化原则决策是否鼓励供应商进行自身安全状态监控投资,并获得供应商的安全状态信息以确定最优订货量;最后,对比分析了两种契约形式的优劣.The supplier＇ s risk is one of the main risk sources in supply chain. To a retailer it＇ s importent to know how to use strategies to deal with the risk and the key point to make the strategy effective is to get the supplier＇ s security state information. On the one hand it＇ s easier for the supplier to know the possible ris （ be- cause the supplier＇ s security state information is privately owned, on the other hand when involved with s scurity state the supplier need to invest in inspection, evaluation or certification to get ~：he information accur~ tely. Under the asymmetric information that the supplier＇ s security state is unknown, this paper studied the retailer based on the profit maximization principle how to present two kinds of contracts ： reward or penalty, to en courage the supplier to invest in inspection or not and get the supplier＇ s security state information. Finally, the paper assessed the advantages and disadvantages of the two kinds of contracts.

关 键 词：供应链 安全状态 奖励 惩罚 不对称信息 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]